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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VARDON W O O L S E Y and CLEA 
WOOLSEY, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
ELLEN B. BROWN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiffs for specific per-
formance under a verbal agreement to purchase real es-
tate. The defendant coimterdaims for possession and for 
$125.00 per month reasonable rental. The defendant, at 
the trial, amended her answer and counterclaim to allege 
the defense by reason of the Statute of Limitations, § 
78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. Judg-
ment was rendered in favor of the defendant in the 
Case No. 
13884 
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amount of $9,717.00 and $12.50 per day rental until dis-
possessed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 12th day of April, 1961, plaintiffe 
entered into an agreement with the defendant and her 
husband, who is now deceased, to purchase a home known 
as Lot 3, Block 1, Columbia Village, a subdivision, re-
corded in the Utah County Recorder's Office, the address 
of which is 9 Roosevelt Avenue, American Work, Utah 
(Tr., p. 9, 10, 11, Ex. 2, 3, 4, Tr., p. 35, 49, 50 and 51). 
With the terms of the agreement, according to plain-
tiffs' testimony, was that they would pay $707.00 down 
payment and assume the balance of a mortgage with the 
Walker Bank and Trust Company, Provo, Utah. These 
terms are substantiated by the receipts as received by 
the plaintiffs from the defendant, Ellen B. Brown (Ex. 
2, 3 and 4). Further, the plaintiffs have made every pay-
ment on the mortgage with the bank, which mortgage 
was paid off on August 30, 1973 (Ex. 5). Part of the 
payment on the mortgage was a $1,200.00 check from the 
insurance company paid on February 20, 1973 (Ex. 5), 
which check was a payment for proceeds from insurance 
for a fire on the garage of the property in question, which 
fire occurred in 1970 (Tr. 14). This insurance payment 
was made out to Mr. Woolsey and Mr. Brown and Walker 
Bank and Trust Company and was paid on an insurance 
policy, the premium of which had been made by the 
plaintiffe. 
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Mrs. Brown, in November of 1970, had a different 
insurance policy issued on the premises in question and 
paid the premium direct without notifying the plaintiffs 
(Ex. 11). However, the policy that paid for the $1,200.00 
fire insurance loss which was applied to the loan was 
the policy that was provided by the plaintiffs. 
On or about April 26, 1966, defendant made a de-
mand for the plaintiffs to pay the special improvement 
Hens, the balance of the down payment which the plain-
tiffs understood to be $49.00, which they did (Ex. 6, 9 
and 15). 
The defendant claims that the terms of the sale of 
the home was to have been $1,337.00 down, $707.00 down 
if paid within 30 days, $1,337.00 if paid after 30 days 
(Tr. p. 49). They were to receive credit for the first 
nine months of the rental if they paid the down within 
the 30 days, which the plaintiffs did not do. Mrs. Brown 
indicated that she agreed to the terms of the sale (Tr. 
p. 49). Mrs. Brown further indicated that she signed all 
of the receipts (Ex. 2 and 3), and that the receipts, even 
though after the 30 day period in which the plaintiffs 
were to receive the rental credit, did not reflect the ad-
ditional amount due because of the non-timely payment 
(Tr. p. 51). Further, Mrs. Brown never made a demand 
for any balance from the plaintiffs (Tr. p. 55). 
The plaintiffs made some capital improvements to 
the home such as carpeting the home and painting and 
replacing plumbing fixtures in the bathroom (Tr. p. 34), 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
as well as paying the special improvement lien as de-
manded by the defendant. 
The plaintiffs tendered to the Court at the trial the 
balance of the down payment as claimed by the defen-
dant, although denying the liability thereof as an offer 
of settlement. The lasl: $49.00 payment on the down 
payment was in the possession of defendant's former 
attorney (Tr. p. 61, Ex. 16). The plaintiffs paid the taxes 
at all times except for the year of 1973. The taxes for 
1973 wwe paid by the defendant (Tr. p. 70). The de-
fendant received $183.58 from the bank from the Escrow 
Account after the loan was paid off (Tr. p. 75). The 
payment that the defendant made in 1973 was in the 
amount of $135.31, the insurance premium paid by Mrs. 
Hrown totals $68.00 (Ex. 11). The total payment that 
the defendant, Mrs. Ellen B. Brown, has made on the 
property in consideration from 1961 when the plaintiffs 
entered into possession under the verbal agreement to 
purchase was $203.31, of which she received back from 
the Escrow Account $183.58, which means that the total 
amount that could possibly be attributed to her on the 
payment of the mortgage at Walker Bank and Trust 
Company would be $19.73. The period of time that plain-
tiffs paid off the mortgage and were in possession was 
a total period of approximately 13 years. 
In 1966 plaintiffs sent to defendant, after receiving 
a verbal threat from the defendant to dispossess, a pro-
posed Uniform Real Estate Contract which carried the 
provision that the defendant pay interest and taxes. This 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
mistake was probably caused by the plaintiffs' attorney's 
lack of understanding of what the plaintiffs outlined as 
the terms of the agreement (Ex. 7). The defendant 
turned the Contract over to her attorney who wrote a 
letter to plaintiffs' attorney (Ex. 15), and plaintiffs' at-
torney replied (Ex. 14). 
On the request of the defendant through her attor-
ney, the plaintiffs took care of the special improvement 
lien and forwarded the balance of the down payment, 
which was $49.00, which $49.00 was in the defendant's 
former attorney's possession. The plaintiffs heard noth-
ing further from the defendant until they received a 
Landlord's Notice to Quit (Ex. 8), on the 9th day of 
October, 1973, which Notice to Quit was forwarded after 
the total payment on the mortgage had been made. The 
District Court dismissed plaintiffs' Cause of Action and 
awarded the defendant a Judgment for $9,717.00 plus 
$12.50 per day rental on a theory of reasonable rental 
value due. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE VERBAL AGREEMENT OF SALE BE-
TWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS AND DEFEN-
DANT WAS A VALID AGREEMENT AND 
SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY ENFORCED. 
The plaintiffs entered into the possession of a home 
under a rental agreement, which rental agreement was 
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later converted to an agreement to purchase a home lo-
cated in American Fork, Utah. The agreement to pur-
chase was entered into the 12th day of April, 1961, which 
agreement provided for the payment of $707.00 as a down 
payment and assuming the balance of a mortgage with 
the Walker Bank and Trust Company in Provo, Utah. 
The plaintiffs received from the defendant, Ellen B. 
Brown, and sgned by her, receipts for the down payment, 
which receipts outlined the balance of the down payment. 
The plaintiffs paid the total amount of the down pay-
ment and paid off the balance of the mortgage. The 
balance of the mortgage was paid off in full on August 
30th, 1973. 
The provisions of § 25-5-8, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, states: 
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall be con-
strued to abridge the powers of Courts to com-
pel the specific performance of agreements in 
case of part performance thereof". 
If Mrs. Brown did, in fact, terminate the agreement 
of purchase, such termination should have been carried 
out with an eviction. It is wholly unjust and inequita-
ble to allow the defendant to receive all of the benefits 
under the contract of purchase and then receive the prop-
erty back. Particularly is this so with the accrual of value 
to the property during the ensuing years. 
In the case under consideration, we not only have 
part performance, we have compleite performance. The 
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only question that could possibly be considered is the 
question of the total amount of the down payment, the 
defendant claiming a total down payment o f$l,337.00 
instead of $707.00, which would leave, if you assume de-
fendant's story to be correct, a balance of $630.00. The 
defendant's claim for the additional $630.00 is in con-
travention to the signed receipts. 
The plaintiffs tendered to the Court the balance of 
$630.00, thereby complying to all the requirements of 
sale agreed to by defendant, assuming the defendant's 
understanding of the agreement to be correct. Defen-
dant's understanding of the agreement is in controvention 
to the receipts signed by the defendant (Ex. 2 and 3). 
There is no question of the terms of the agreement 
in the defendant's mind. She spelled them out in detail, 
she agreed to them (Tr. p. 49), she signed all of the re-
ceipts. So, under the very worst of interpretations on be-
half of plaintiffs, there is no question but what they would 
be entitled to recover if they paid the total amount due 
according to Mrs. Brown. She made no demand for pay-
ment of the down payment. According to Mrs. Brown 
the $630.00 would not have come due until 30 days after 
the day of agreement in 1961 and there was no time limit 
agreed upon for the payment of the down payment or 
the balance of the down payment when plaintiffs thought 
they had the total down payment paid in 1966. 
In re Roth's Estate, 2 U. (2d) 40, 269 P. 2do 278, 
"Where the existence of the oral contract is es-
tablished by an admission of the party resisting 
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specific perft>rmance or by competent evidence 
independent of the acts of part performance, the 
requirement that the acts of part performance 
must be exclusively referable to the oral con-
tract is satisfied." 
Further, "part performance was established 
where it was shown that the defendant had 
moved onto the property, made improvements 
and paid half of the purchase price to the plain-
tiff." 
Also see Christensen v. Christensen, 9 U. (2d) 102, 
339 P. 2d 101, and Adams v. Taylor, 15 U. (2d) 296, 391 
P. 2d 837. 
In this case, the terms of the agreement in plaintiff 
Vardon Woolsey's mind was firm and clear, to pay $707.00 
down and assume the balance of the loan. In the mind 
of the defendant the terms were perfectly clear to pay 
$707.00 down if paid within 30 days, and $1,337.00 if paid 
after the 30 days., and the balance of the mortgage. 
There is no question that there was an agreement to 
sell, and since the plaintiffs tendered to the Court the 
balance of the down payment under the terms as alleged 
by the defendant, it doesn't seem that there could be any 
question but what the plaintiffs would be entitled to 
receive the property under the terms of the agreement 
to sell, all of the conditions of taking the contract from 
under the Statute of Frauds having been met. 
The defendant alleges that she terminated the real 
estate agreement in 1966. However, her actions show 
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oiiierwise. She demanded that the plaintiffs pay the 
special improvement liens, which they did. She demanded 
the balance of the down payment from the plaintiffs 
which was $49.00, which the plaintiffs forwarded to her 
attorney. She demanded the termination of the joint 
tenancy between herself and her husband, which the 
plaintiffs did not do and which the defendant did not 
do (Ex. 1), but which she indicated in her testimony was 
done (Tr. p. 53), and she left thorn in possession con-
tinuing to pay the balance due on the mortgage without 
further complaint. For an excellent discussion of the 
law on this subject, see the Note in 9 Utah Law Review 
103, The Doctrine of Part Performance as Applied to 
Oral Land Contracts in Utah. 
The doctrine of specific performance is an equitable 
one and to allow the defendant to recover possession of 
this real property after the plaintiffs having been in 
possession 13 years and having paid off the mortgage 
thereon, and having paid the special improvement hens, 
the taxes, the fire insurance and made such other capital 
improvements as an owner of property would ordinarily 
make, is not doing equity in any sense of the word. This 
agrement is supported by testimony from the plaintiffs 
and the defendant and three receipts signed by the de-
fendant. 
The only question in regard to what the agreement 
was is the question of whether or not the defendant was 
entitled to an additional $630.00 down payment. This 
additional $630.00 was not supported by the information 
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on the written receipts signed by the defendant. Not-
withstanding this, the plaintiffs made a proffer in Court 
to pay the additional $630.00. The defendant at no time 
has made a demand for any additional money under her 
understanding of the down payment 
POINT II. 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS, § 78-12-25, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, DO 
NOT APPLY TO THE TERMS OF THIS 
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WHETHER 
VERBAL OR WRITTEN. 
§ 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
states: 
"Within four years: (1) An action upon a con-
tract, obligation or liability not founded upon an 
instrument in writing; also on an open account 
foor goods, wares and merchandise, and for any 
article charged in a store account; also, on an 
open account for work, labor or services ren-
dered, or materials furnished; provided, that ac-
tion in all of the foregoing cases may be com-
menced at any time within four years after the 
last charge is made or the last payment is re-
ceived. (2) An action for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law." 
In the instant case, the last payment was made and 
received on August 30, 1973, and the action in this matter 
was commenced on the 13th day of December, 1973. 
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Under no sense of the terms of the agreement could four 
years have passed from the time of the last payment made 
until the commencement of the action. 
POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
RECOVER FOR THE REASONABLE REN-
TAL VALUE. 
The plaintiffs were originally put into possession of 
the property under consideration under a rental agree-
ment, said rental agreement provided for the payment 
of $70.00 per month. Thereafter, the plaintiffs' payments 
were increased to cover the mortgage insurance and taxes 
under the purchase agreement. If, in fact, there was no 
enforceable purchase agreement, then the purchase agree-
ment terms would be the rental agreement. 
In no snse of the word would the defendant be en-
titled to the reasonable rental value if she, in fact, had 
a rental agreement (purchase agreement) and made no 
demand for any increase in rent or payments over the 
13 year period plaintiffs were in possession. If she agreed 
that plaintiffs could have possession of the house for 
the payments they were making and consented to their 
possession without making any additional demands, the 
reasonable rental value is immaterial and to grant to the 
defendant a Judgment based on the reasonable rental 
value supported by her testimony alone after making 
no demand for any increase in rental and agreeing to 
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their possession for the amounts paid, is inequitable and 
unjust in the extreme. The rental value would be that 
to which the parties had agreed and there is no evidence 
that the defendant did not agree to the rental for the 
payments per month that were made. In fact, there was 
no evidence of any demand for an increase over the 
$70.00 per month rental originally agreed upon. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs entered into an agreement to purchase a 
home between the defendant and her husband, now de-
ceased, on or about the 12th day of April, 1961. 
Defendant's understanding of the terms of the agree-
ment of purchase were spelled out and agreed to by the 
defendant in the testimony as found on Page 49 of the 
Transcript, thereby taldng it from without the Statute 
of Frauds in the provisions of § 25-5-8, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended, and this contract to purchase 
should be enforced. 
The Statute of limitations had not begun to run 
until after the last payment was made in August of 1973. 
This is an equity matter and is expected that sub-
stantial justice in this sort of action will be enforced. 
Plaintiffs have been in quiet possession of the prop-
erty for approximately 13 years under an agreement to 
purchase and if, in fact, the agreement to purchase is 
not in force or effect, then under a monthly rental agree-
ment wherein the parties agreed to accept the payments 
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being made under the purchase agreement, then the ques-
tio nof the reasonable rental value is completely imma-
terial and defendant is in no way entitled to recovr on 
any theory under reasonable rental value. 
Therefore, the plaintiffs-appellants should be entitled 
to receive from the defendant a good and valid Warranty 
Deed and that the Judgment rendered against the plain-
tiffs for the reasonable rental value should be stricken. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON 
Suite 204 Executive Building 
455 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
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